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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 20050939
ADRIENNE GOESER GUBLER,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the court of appeals by
provision of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
a. Issue: Was it misconduct for the prosecutor to ask the defendant
questions that implied the existence of prejudicial facts where the prosecution had no
evidence to prove the existence of such facts? R 210, at 223.
Standard of review: Prosecutorial misconduct requires reversal where (1)
the prosecutor's remarks call matters to the jurors' attention which they would not be
justified in considering in reaching a verdict and (2) such remarks were harmful. State v.
Haga, 954 P.2d 1284 (Utah App.1998).

b. Issue: Did the prosecutor's introduction of new lines of argument "in
rebuttal" effectively permit the State to insulate these arguments from any response by
the defense and thereby deny the defendant due process of law? R 210, at 261, 265-266.
Standard of review: The trial court's discretion in regulating the scope of
the State's rebuttal "is not so broad as to permit a Trial Judge to oversee a blow to a
defendant's right to a fair trial via the State's sandbagging." Bailey v. State, 440 A.2d
997, 1003 (Del.Supr.1982). "Closing argument is an aspect of a fair trial which is
implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by which the States are
bound." Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189, 205 (Del.Supr.1980).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Rule 17(g)(7), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Rule 17. The trial.
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial
shall proceed in the following order:
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or
on both sides without argument, the prosecution shall open
the argument, the defense shall follow and the prosecution
may close by responding to the defense argument. The court
may set reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel for
each party and the time to be allowed for argument.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for
Washington County, the Honorable James L. Shumate presiding. The appeal is taken

2

from a judgment of conviction, sentence, and the order denying defendant's motion for a
new trial.

Proceedings in the Lower Court. Defendant Adrienne Goeser Gubler was charged
with the offenses of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a third degree felony; FORGERY,
a third degree felony; IDENTITY FRAUD, a third degree felony; and THEFT, a third
degree felony. Following trial, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on all of the offenses
charged.

Disposition in the Trial Court. When the matter came on for sentencing, the district
court concluded that, under the facts of the case, the offenses charged merged into the
offenses of IDENTITY FRAUD, a third degree felony, and THEFT, a third degree
felony. The court entered judgments of conviction accordingly and imposed sentence
pursuant to statute. The court then stayed the execution of the sentence and placed the
defendant on supervised probation. The district court denied defendant's subsequent
motion for a new trial.

Statement of Facts.
The State's Legitimate Case. On January 23, 2004, the defendant in the
company of one Robert Dunn approached the drive up window at the St. George
Boulevard branch of the State Bank of Southern Utah (State Bank). The defendant was
driving the vehicle and Robert Dunn was seated in the front passenger seat. R 209, at
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154-158; 210, at 211-212. The defendant placed a check and a deposit slip in the
document shuttle and sent them into the bank teller. R 209, at 155.
This check was drawn in the amount of $3850 against Robert Dunn's
business account at Wells Fargo Bank in favor of Mr. Dunn's wife, Elizabeth, who
maintained an account at State Bank. R 209, at 155 ; State's Exhibit 12. Robert Dunn
had signed what purported to be his wife's endorsement on the back of the check.
Robert Dunn had also signed what purported to be Elizabeth Dunn's signature on the
deposit slip on the line requesting that a portion of the funds represented by the check be
paid out in cash. R 209, at 142-143; State's Exhibits 12 and 13. The deposit slip
directed State Bank to deposit $1350 of the funds represented by the check into Elizabeth
Dunn's account and to pay out the remaining $2500 in cash. State's Exhibit 13.
The bank teller completed the transaction without requesting any
identification, crediting $1350 to Elizabeth Dunn's account and paying the sum of $2500
out in cash.1 R 209, at 155-156. The check drawn on Robert Dunn's business account
was worthless, that account having been closed for some time. R 209, at 67-68.
On January 26, 2004, the defendant and Robert Dunn again approached the
drive up window at State Bank's St. George Boulevard branch. The defendant was
driving the vehicle and Robert Dunn was seated in the front passenger seat. The
^ o t h the defendant and Robert Dunn testified that the defendant immediately handed the
money over to Robert Dunn and that the defendant never had the use or benefit of any of the
money obtained in this or a later transaction that occurred on January 26, 2004. R 210, at
197-198, 203, 212. The State offered no evidence that would suggest that the facts were
otherwise. R 209, at 155. For some reason unknown to the defendant, Robert Dunn's
testimony was not made a part of the record. R 210, at 187.
4

defendant placed a check and a deposit slip in the document shuttle and sent them into
the bank teller. R 209, at 103-105.
This time the bank teller asked for identification. In response to this
request the defendant purportedly stated that she did not have her identification with her,
but that her "husband" did.2 R 209, at 105, 115. Ultimately, the teller advised the
defendant and Robert Dunn that State Bank "would have to put a hold on the account for
11 business days until we could verify [the funds]." R 209, at 116.
Later that evening the defendant approached the walk-up window at State
Bank's Washington City branch. R 209, at 123-124. She presented the teller with a
check drawn on Robert Dunn's business account, together with a deposit slip, apparently
the same deposit slip that had been presented to the teller at the St. George Boulevard
branch earlier that day. R 209, at 124-125. The deposit slip had been revised to facilitate
a transaction in a different amount than the transaction that had been proposed at the St.
George Boulevard branch. R 209, at 124-125; State's Exhibits 14 and 15. Robert Dunn
had signed what purported to be his wife's signature on the deposit slip on the line
requesting that a portion of the funds purportedly represented by the check be paid out in
cash. Robert Dunn had also signed what purported to be Elizabeth Dunn's endorsement
on the back of the check. R 209, at 142-143.
The teller at the Washington City branch completed the transaction without
requesting any identification, gave the defendant cash back in the amount of $1000 and
2

The defendant has consistently denied having referred to Robert Dunn as her "husband."
R 189; 209, at 157; 210, at 215-216.
5

credited $1500 to Elizabeth Dunn's account, the balance of the funds purportedly
represented by the check. R 209, at 126. The check drawn against Robert Dunn's
business account was worthless. R 209, at 170-171; State's Exhibit 14.

The State's Attempt to Suggest That Defendant Had Been Involved in
Committing or Facilitating Other Frauds. In addition to the loss of the $3500 in cash
that had been delivered to the defendant and Robert Dunn, the State Bank suffered
additional losses amounting to approximately $2,840. R 209, at 171. These losses
resulted from the fact that someone withdrew the funds that had been credited to
Elizabeth Dunn's account before State Bank had taken measures to protect its interests.
R 209, at 170-172. Those who investigated the loss occasioned by the withdrawal of
these funds initially considered the possibility the checks that had been drawn against
Elizabeth Dunn's account had also been forgeries. R 209, at 170-172. See also R 188.
It was nearly four months before the defendant learned that her
involvement with the State Bank had became the subject of a police investigation. On
May 24, 2004, Detective Doug Sargent of the St. George City Police Department
contacted the defendant and asked her to come to the police station. R 209, at 154.
Detective Sargent testified that at the outset of his interview with the defendant, Sargent
was not sure of the dates of the transactions in question, was "still trying to sort
everything out," and "was confused at the beginning of how this went down." R 209, at
156-157. According to Sargent, after discussing the January 23rd transaction with the
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defendant, he had "kind of jumped into the next one not knowing it was a separate
transaction

" R 209, at 157.
During the interview on May 24th, the defendant, according to Sargent,

"didn't remember the exacts other than she was there." R 209, at 156. However, the
defendant made a written statement on that date. R 209, at 158-159. This statement
consisted of two pages which were later received into evidence as State's Exhibits 18 and
19. See Addenda A and B. R 209, at 158-159. Notwithstanding the defendant's initial
confusion and although her written statement was somewhat muddled, by the time
Detective Sargent had finished the interview he was able to make an accurate outline of
the events of January 23 and 26, 2004, and was able to summarize the defendant's
contacts with State Bank. R 188-191; 209, at 156. See Addendum C.
After Exhibits 18 and 19 had been received into evidence, the State's
prosecutor asked Detective Sargent to characterize the statements that the defendant had
made therein as admissions "to other instances in which she had attempted to cash money
from Elizabeth Dunn's account." R 209, at 160. Detective Sargent accommodated the
prosecutor, testifying that the defendant had admitted involvement in two such instances,
one involving a check in the amount of $750 and another involving a check in the
amount of $250. R209, at 161.
While the State's prosecutor was eliciting this testimony from Detective
Sargent, the prosecutor knew that State Bank personnel had already determined that
someone had apparently advised Elizabeth Dunn that funds had purportedly been
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deposited into her account at State Bank and also knew that Elizabeth Dunn had
withdrawn the funds that had been credited to her account. R 209, at 170-172.
In cross-examining the defendant, the State's prosecutor continued to
pursue his theory of defendant's multiple thwarted attempts to obtain funds from the
State Bank. R 210, at 220-224. However, the defendant steadfastly maintained that the
incidents of January 23rd and 26th were the only times she had transacted or attempted to
transact business at the State Bank. R 210, at 221, 224-225, 228. See Addendum D.
The State was not in the possession of any evidence which established that
the defendant had in fact made other unsuccessful attempts to transact business with
State Bank or any other financial institution and had no good faith basis for pursuing a
line of questioning that suggested that she had. R 210, at 223.

The Prosecutor's Approach to Closing Argument. When the State's
prosecutor was given the opportunity in closing argument to summarize the State's case
against the defendant, he confined the opening portion of his argument to an abstract
discussion of the concept of reasonable doubt, employing some allegory about a
newspaper boy's footsteps in freshly fallen snow. R 210, at 241-242. The prosecutor's
opening argument constitutes just under two pages of the trial transcript and makes no
reference to the evidence presented in the instant case or the facts which the State
contended had been established thereby. R 210, at 241-242.
Then, after defense counsel had completed his summation, the State's
prosecutor again addressed the jury and for the first time outlined what the State
8

contended had been established by the evidence. R 210, at 249-263. In so doing the
State's prosecutor argued that the last check that Wells Fargo Bank had record of passing
through Robert Dunn's business account before that account was closed in July 2003 was
check number 1132 and the check drawn against that account on January 23, 2004, was
"check 1190." R 210, at 252-253. From these facts, the prosecutor's argument seemed
to suggest that Robert Dunn's business account might have been used to facilitate
something in the neighborhood of sixty frauds. R 210, at 253. This, the prosecutor
contended, was evidence that the defendant had "reason to know" that she was
facilitating a fraud when she participated in the transactions of January 23rd and 26th. R
210, at 253. This argument was advanced for the first time during the "rebuttal" portion
of the State's closing argument. In fact, the State had no evidence that Robert Dunn's
business account had been used to facilitate other fraudulent transactions.
The State's prosecutor then went on to argue that the defendant had
admitted going to the State Bank with Robert Dunn on two occasions other than those
which were the subject of the offenses charged. R 210, at 255-256. The prosecutor's
argument further suggested that on at least two occasions State Bank had refused to
complete transactions with the defendant and that this was further evidence of the fact
that the defendant must have known that she was facilitating a fraud. R 210, at 257.
There is no doubt that the State's prosecutor knew that it was Elizabeth
Dunn who had withdrawn the funds that had been credited to her account. R 209, at
170-172. Still, he persisted in arguing that the defendant admitted attempting to cash a
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check in the amount of $750 and another in the amount of $250 (R 210, at 256), the same
checks which the defendant purportedly presented in unsuccessful attempts "to cash
money from Elizabeth Dunn's account." R 209, at 160-161.
When defense counsel objected on the grounds that the prosecutor's
argument was not "rebuttal," the objection was overruled. R 210, at 261, 265-266.
The jury returned verdicts of guilty on all of the offenses charged and the
district court imposed sentence according to statute, stayed the execution of the sentence
and placed the defendant on supervised probation. R 128-130. Thereafter, the defendant
moved the court for an order granting the defendant a new trial on the grounds that the
prosecutor's introduction of new lines of argument "in rebuttal" effectively permitted the
State to insulate these arguments from any response by the defense and denied the
defendant due process of law. R 173-185. This motion was denied. R 197.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State's prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he asked the defendant
and Detective Sargent questions that implied that the defendant had attempted and had
admitted having attempted to cash checks drawn against Elizabeth Dunn's bank account.
The State had no evidence demonstrating that the defendant had ever attempted to pass a
check drawn against Elizabeth Dunn's account. Moreover, the prosecutor knew that the
funds that had been credited to Mrs. Dunn's account had been withdrawn by means of
checks which Elizabeth Dunn herself had drawn against her own account.
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The defendant was denied due process of law by the prosecutor's use of the
"rebuttal" portion of his closing argument as a vehicle for the initial introduction of lines
of argument which suggested that Robert Dunn's business account might have been used
to facilitate something in the neighborhood of sixty uncharged frauds and further
suggested that the defendant had attempted to cash checks drawn against Elizabeth
Dunn's account. This tactic effectively denied the defendant any opportunity to respond
to these arguments.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN MISCONDUCT
WHEN HE PURSUED A LINE OF QUESTIONING THAT
IMPLIED THE EXISTENCE OF PREJUDICIAL FACTS
WHERE THE STATE HAD NO EVIDENCE THAT
ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH FACTS.
It is improper for the prosecutor to ask an accused a question that implies
the existence of a prejudicial fact unless the prosecution can prove the existence of that
fact. See State v. Ernmett, 839 P.2d 781, 786-87 (Utah 1992).
In the instant case, the State's principal theory of the defendant's
culpability was based upon the fact that the defendant had helped Robert Dunn procure
cash from State Bank on January 23rd and 26th by purporting to deposit money into
Elizabeth Dunn's account at State Bank and using these transactions as opportunities to
request the immediate payment in cash of a portion of the funds purportedly represented
by the checks which were presented for deposit. In an attempt to prove that the
11

defendant must have known that she was facilitating a fraud, the State's prosecutor
elicited testimony from Detective Sargent to the effect that the defendant had admitted
that she had attempted to cash checks drawn against Elizabeth Dunn's account. R 209, at
160-161. Sargent testified that the defendant had admitted having attempted to pass one
such check in the amount of $750 and another in the amount of $250. R 209, at 161. It
was apparently the prosecution's objective to suggest that the defendant had attempted to
draw against the funds which State Bank had credited to Elizabeth Dunn's account as a
result of the deposits that had purportedly been made on January 23rd and 26th. R 209,
at 170-171.
On cross-examination, it became obvious that Detective Sargent was not
aware of any evidence which suggested that the defendant (or anyone else) had presented
bogus checks in the amount of $750 or $250 against Elizabeth Dunn's account. R 209,
at 163-166.3 Nevertheless, the prosecutor continued to pursue this theory when the
3

When Detective Sargent was asked if he had intended to suggest that there were other
forged checks that had not yet surfaced, the following exchange ensued:
Q
A
Q
A
Q

A

[By defense counsel] Are you suggesting that there's
another check out there that's never surfaced?
[By Detective Doug Sargent] It could be. I don't know.
It might have happened in Cedar City too. I'm not sure.
But this may be just her account of this incident on the
26th, correct?
I suppose it's possible. But the amounts are different.
Are you suggesting to this jury that she, in this
document, has made admissions to something other than
what we have been talking about here in court?
I don't know what she's saying in that, to be honest with
you.
12

defendant took the witness stand. On cross-examination, he repeatedly asked the
defendant to admit that she had attempted to pass two checks, one in the amount of $750
and another in the amount of $250. R 210, at 220-225. See Addendum D. The
defendant steadfastly maintained that the incidents of January 23rd and 26th were the
only times she had transacted or attempted to transact business at the State Bank. R 210,
at 221, 224-225, 228.
The prosecutor's lack of good faith in pursuing this line of questioning is
apparent. Immediately after interviewing the defendant on May 24, 2004, Detective
Sargent was able to outline the events of January 23 and 26, 2004, in some detail and
was able to identify and summarize the contacts which the defendant had had with State
Bank. R 188-191. Nothing in Detective Sargent's police report (R 188-191) or in his
testimony at the preliminary hearing (R 208, at 51-57) suggested that Sargent had
understood defendant's written statement to include an admission that the defendant had
been involved in trying to pass forged checks drawn against Elizabeth Dunn's bank
account. The suggestion that Sargent had so construed the defendant's written statement
first emerges at trial where the prosecutor uses the so-called confession as a means of
suggesting that the defendant's participation in uncharged offenses evidenced the fact
that she must have known that she was helping Robert Dunn perpetrate a fraud.
The State had no evidence establishing that any bogus checks had been
drawn against Elizabeth Dunn's account. Moreover, the prosecutor knew that the funds

R 209, at 165.
13

that had been credited to Mrs. Dunn's account had been withdrawn by means of checks
which Elizabeth Dunn herself had drawn against her own account. R 209, at 170-172.
Prosecutors have a duty to eschew all improper tactics. State v. Tillman,
750 P.2d 546, 557 (Utah 1987). As the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly noted:
[A prosecuting attorney] is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
Justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of
which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He
may prosecute with earnestness and vigor - indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not
at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one.
State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f 31, 992 P.2d 951, 961 (quoting State v. Emmett, 839
P.2d at 787 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935))).
Certainly the prosecutor had the right to explore any incongruities in
defendant's written statements and to require the defendant, on cross-examination, to
clarify anything in her statements that required clarification. However, this does not
mean that in so doing the State may ask the accused questions that imply the existence of
prejudicial facts which the prosecution is not in a position to prove. This rule should
apply with greater force where the prosecutor's line of questioning was calculated to
suggest that the defendant had attempted to withdraw money from Elizabeth Dunn's
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account when the prosecutor knew that it was Mrs. Dunn herself who had withdrawn the
funds that had been credited to her account.

POINT II
THE PROSECUTOR'S INTRODUCTION OF NEW LINES
OF ARGUMENT "IN REBUTTAL55 EFFECTIVELY
PERMITTED THE STATE TO INSULATE THESE
ARGUMENTS FROM ANY RESPONSE BY THE
DEFENSE AND DENIED THE DEFENDANT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.
Clearly, the accused in a criminal case has a Due Process right to have an
opportunity to respond to any evidence which the State produces against her. Just as
clearly, the accused has a Due Process right to an opportunity to respond to any
arguments that the State advances. See generally, U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 1999
UT 303, Tf 63, 990 P.2d 945 ('To allow a party to raise new issues in its rebuttal materials
is improper because it precludes the other party the opportunity to respond.").
Rule 17(g)(7), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides as followed:
Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on
both sides without argument, the prosecution shall open the
argument, the defense shall follow and the prosecution may
close by responding to the defense argument. The court may
set reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel for each
party and the time to be allowed for argument.
Emphasis added.
In the district court, the State cited State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603 (Utah
1985), for the proposition that: "Utah courts have already found that it is not improper
for the prosecution to initially make a brief statement of the case in its closing argument
15

and reserve most of the argument for rebuttal." R. 193. Indeed, the defendant would
agree that the prosecutor may devote most of the time allotted the State for summation to
rebutting the arguments advanced by the defense.
In McClain, the Utah Supreme Court found no impropriety in the
prosecution's tactic of making a brief summation of the case in closing argument and
reserving the majority of his time for rebuttal. However, in so holding, the court noted
that Rule 17 requires the prosecution to "limit rebuttal to only those matters argued by
the defense." Id. at 607. Although the prosecutor in that case had reserved the majority
of his time for rebuttal, he had apparently limited his closing argument to rebutting those
matters that had been argued by the defense. Id. In the instant case, the problem lies not
in the fact that the prosecutor reserved most of his time for closing, but in the fact that he
used his closing as a vehicle for the introduction of arguments to which the defense
would never have an opportunity to respond.
The principles governing closing argument are simple and straight forward.
In the opening portion of his argument the prosecutor should develop the points which
he contends support the defendant's conviction. The defendant is then afforded an
opportunity to answer the State's argument and to develop all the points he considers to
be of importance. Then the prosecutor in closing may reply to and counter any argument
the defendant has made. See Bailey v. State, 440 A.2d 997 (Del.Supr.1982). The
prosecutor's closing argument should be in the nature of a rebuttal. The State should not
conceal or "sandbag" by wholly omitting from argument a salient point or feature of the
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case and then make a closing argument on that feature. Bailey v. State, 440 A.2d at
1002.
The courts traditionally confined the scope of the prosecutor's rebuttal
strictly to a response to points raised in defense counsel's closing argument. See Johnson
v. State, 192 Wis. 22, 211 N.W. 668 (1927). This rule was rooted in the concepts of due
process and fundamental fairness. Simply put, it is unfair and often highly prejudicial for
the State's prosecutor to avoid treatment of certain issues in the opening summation so as
to deprive defense counsel of the opportunity to reply. State v. Davis, 126 S.W.3d 398
(Mo.App.2004) ("'[I]t is improper and unfair for state's counsel, in final argument, to
refer to points upon which the state relies which were not mentioned in opening
argument, for the reason that the defense is thereby deprived of the opportunity to answer
such new points.' The purpose of the rule is to allow defense counsel to answer the
state's argument."); Bailey, 440 A.2d at 1002-1003.
Although it is the preferable and customary practice for the State's
prosecutor to limit rebuttal to those issues raised in defense counsel's summation, "this
principle is honored more in its breach than in its observance." Chandler v. Miles, 38
Del. 431, 193 A. 576, 580 (1937). Typically, the breach occurs where the prosecutor
makes only introductory or perfunctory remarks in his opening summation and utilizes
his rebuttal for the "argument in chief." Bailey, 440 A.2d, at 1002-1003.
The traditional rule has evolved somewhat to give trial courts a modicum
of discretion to allow a more substantial rebuttal which is not so narrowly tailored to the
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scope of defense counsel's summation. See State v. Rosa, 170 Conn. 417, 365 A.2d
1135, cert denied, 429 U.S. 845, 50 L. Ed. 2d 116, 97 S. Ct. 126 (1976); United States v.
Lawson, 483 F.2d 535 (8th Cir. 1973); Moore v. United States, 120 U.S. App. D.C. 173,
344 F.2d 558 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Marks v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 769, 218 N.W.2d 328 (1974);
State v. Peterson, 423 S.W.2d 825 (Mo. 1968); Chandler, supra.
In Bailey v. State, supra, the prosecutor delivered a very brief opening
summation. With the exception of a passing reference to one of the witnesses, the
prosecutor did not comment on the testimony of any of the witnesses. After the State had
completed its opening summation, defense counsel objected to the State's apparent
strategy of making introductory remarks in the opening summation and using the closing
summation, not as a rebuttal, but as a vehicle to carry the thrust of its case to the jury.
The record was devoid of any ruling on this objection. In his summation, defense
counsel addressed the testimony of certain witnesses but did not comment on the
testimony given by others and did not discuss statements allegedly made by defendant at
the time of his arrest. The State's rebuttal lasted over an hour and contained the bulk of
the State's final argument to the jury. The prosecution utilized the rebuttal to discuss
numerous matters which were not mentioned by the defense in its summation or by the
State itself in its opening summation. Thereafter, defense counsel moved for a mistrial
based, inter alia, upon the prosecutor's "sandbagging" strategy. The trial judge denied
the motion. The defendant was convicted and appealed.
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In reversing the defendant's conviction, the Delaware Supreme Court
stated:
While the authorities we have cited invest the Trial Court
with a measure of discretion as to the application of the rule
governing the scope of a rebuttal, that discretion is not so
broad as to permit a Trial Judge to oversee a blow to a
defendant's right to a fair trial via the State's sandbagging.
"Closing argument is an aspect of a fair trial which is implicit
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by
which the States are bound." It is incumbent upon the Trial
Judge to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial through
constant vigilance over the conduct of all officers of the
Court, even without an objection thereto. We caution against
any abdication of this important responsibility. . . .
To reiterate our firm belief: "Counsel should not conceal or
withhold his position. He should play the cards dealt him
face up and in his rightful turn. He has no right to sneak an
ace out of the discards and play it later."
440 A.2d, at 1003-1004. Citations omitted.
In Presi v. Maryland, 73 Md. App. 375, 534 A.2d 370 (1987), the State
introduced defendant's financial records into evidence to show an accumulation of
savings consistent with the prosecution's theory that the defendant had been selling
narcotics. The prosecutor made no mention of the defendant's finances in his initial
closing argument. Likewise, defense counsel avoided any mention of such matters. In
his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor addressed the defendant's pecuniary resources for
the first time. The defendant objected on the grounds that this was not proper rebuttal.
The trial judge overruled the objection. The defendant was convicted and on appeal
contended that by permitting the State to address an issue in its rebuttal argument which
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the parties did not address in their initial closing arguments, the trial court "permits the
State to insulate this new argument from any response by the defense." 73 Md.App. at
376. The Maiyland Court of Special Appeals agreed and reversed. In so doing the court
noted:
In the case at bar, the argument that appellant had substantial
savings, consistent with the theory that he was selling
cocaine, was a pertinent argument. A police officer testified
that he bought cocaine from appellant, but his identification
of appellant as the seller was seriously disputed. Therefore,
we are not convinced that the State's unrebutted argument
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The conduct of a trial is left largely to the sound discretion of
the trial judge. Had the trial judge given the defendant an
opportunity to rebut the State's new argument, the probability
for error in this regard could have been avoided. Because no
such opportunity was given, the trial judge's decision was an
abuse of discretion. Appellant's failure to request the
opportunity is not significant under the circumstances of this
case. His timely objection to the State's argument alerted the
court that he did not want the State to make an unrebutted
argument. It was the prosecutor and the trial court who
varied the normal procedure.
73 Md.App. at 377. Citations omitted.
Turning now to the facts of the case before the court, defendant contends
that her participation in the transaction of January 23rd would not have satisfactorily
demonstrated that the defendant had acted with a blameworthy state of mind. The events
of that day, standing alone, demonstrate nothing more than the fact that the defendant
had given Robert Dunn a ride to the State Bank and helped him make the transaction by
sending the paperwork into the teller.
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Defense counsel began his closing argument by acknowledging that when
the defendant made her written statement of May 24, 2004, she was not able to perfectly
reconstruct the events of January 2004. R 210, at 244. Counsel noted that State Bank's
teller had no memory of the January 23rd transaction because there was nothing out of
the ordinary in the transaction. R 210, at 243. Defense counsel then suggested that in
reconstructing the events of January 23rd the defendant had done as well as could be
expected if one entertains the possibility that she actually thought she was merely helping
a friend make a deposit and had no reason to make special note of the transaction. R
210, at 243-244.
Then turning to the events of January 26th, defense counsel acknowledged
that the defendant knew that Robert Dunn had altered the deposit slip after the teller at
the Boulevard branch had indicated that the bank would not disperse cash until the funds
could be verified. Counsel argued that knowledge of this fact did not put the defendant
on notice that Robert Dunn was attempting to defraud Elizabeth Dunn, (R 210, at 245247), that the evidence indicated that there was no attempt to defraud Mrs. Dunn and
that, in fact, Elizabeth Dunn had apparently profited from Robert Dunn's scheme. R
210, at 247-248.
Finally, defense counsel argued that the defendant would have had no
reason to know that Robert Dunn intended to defraud State Bank unless she knew that
the check Mr. Dunn had drawn against his own business account was worthless.
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Defense counsel further argued that there was no evidence establishing that the
defendant knew that the account had been closed. R 210, at 247-248.
Obviously, the State's prosecutor had the right to respond to the
defendant's arguments. The issue is whether or not the arguments which the State
advanced were in fact appropriate "rebuttal."
The State's burden of proof required the production of direct or
circumstantial evidence which established or from which the trier of fact could
reasonably infer that the defendant knew she was facilitating a fraud. Nevertheless, in
his opening argument, the prosecutor did not articulate any basis for imputing knowledge
of Robert Dunn's fraudulent intent to the defendant. The State waited until after
defendant had concluded her closing argument before suggesting that the defendant had
reason to know that numerous unidentified checks had been written against Robert
Dunn's business account after it had been closed. R 210, at 253. This argument was
based upon an incidental fact that surfaced during the testimony of Dianne McDaniel, an
officer of Wells Fargo Bank.
Ms. McDaniel was called as a witness for the purpose of establishing that
Wells Fargo Bank had closed Robert Dunn's business account on July 17, 2003, some
sixth months before the issuance of the checks in question. R 209, at 65-68. In the
course of her testimony, Ms. McDaniel mentioned that the last check that had been
presented for payment against that account before the account had been closed was check
number 1132. R 209, at 67. She also testified that any check presented for payment after
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July 17, 2003, would have been "returned 'account closed."5 R 209, at 68. Finally, Ms.
McDaniel testified that she did not have any record of checks that might have been
presented to Wells Fargo for payment after Robert Dunn's business account had been
closed. R 209, at 68.
At no time during the presentation of the evidence did the State advance
the theory that any check, other than State's Exhibits 12 and 14, had in fact been drawn
against Robert Dunn's business account after it had been closed. Nevertheless, in the
"rebuttal" portion of his summation, the State's prosecutor seized the opportunity to
advance an argument that suggested that something in the neighborhood of sixty checks
may have been written against Robert Dunn's closed account (R 210, at 252-253) and
that the defendant was somehow aware of this "fact" and therefore had "reason to know"
that she was facilitating a fraud. R 210, at 253.
In the strictest sense, this argument is "rebuttal." It rebuts defendant's
argument that she thought she was merely helping a friend make a deposit. Nevertheless,
the prosecutor's use of this tactic was improper. First, there was no evidence that Robert
Dunn had written other checks against his closed account. R 209, at 68. Moreover, even
if Mr. Dunn had written other checks against this account after it had been closed, there
was no evidence that the defendant would have had knowledge of any such checks.
Finally, even if the prosecutor could have properly advanced this argument, he was under
a duty to raise it in his opening argument so the defendant would have had an
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opportunity to respond, rather than "sneak[ing] an ace out of the discards and play[ing] it
later." Bailey, 440 A.2d, at 1004.
Finally, the defendant contends that, for the same reasons noted above, it
was improper for the State's prosecutor to use his "rebuttal" to advance an argument that
was calculated to suggest that the defendant surely knew that she was facilitating a fraud
because she had supposedly transacted or attempted to transact business with State Bank,
on at least five encounters and she had been "denied" on at least two (and arguably three)
of those occasions. R 210, at 255-257. This argument was an obvious allusion to the socalled "other instances in which [the defendant] had attempted to cash money from
Elizabeth Dunn's account." R 209, at 160-161.
Clearly, the notion that this defendant had been involved in attempting to
withdraw the funds that had been credited to Elizabeth Dunn's account had been
dispelled by the time the evidence was in. See Point I, supra. The prosecutor did not
mention it in his opening argument and, during his argument, defense counsel made only
a passing mention of the defendant's imperfect attempt to reconstruct the events of
January 2004. The State's revival of this theory "in rebuttal" was improper and unfair.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that the defendant
was prejudiced by the prosecutor's tactic of asking questions which suggested that the
defendant had been involved in withdrawing funds that had been credited to Elizabeth
Dunn's bank account and that the defendant was denied due process of law in not having
24

an opportunity to address arguments which the State raised for the first time "in rebuttal."
The defendant's conviction must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of April, 2006.

Gary W. Pendleton
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that on this 27th day April, 2006,1 did personally mail
or cause to be mailed, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct copies of the
above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Utah Attorney
General, Appeals Division, 160 East 300 South, 6th Fir., P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake
City, UT 84114-0854.

Gary W. Pendleton
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Incident Date: 05/26/04

Date: ** : ** : ** **/**/**

D Sargent P051
Mon May 24 15:56:27 MDT 2004
Case #0403133
SYNOPSIS
The suspect wrote out two bad checks and deposited them into his
ex wife's account. He then forged her endorsement and withdrew $2500 and
$1000. A female subject was present at the time posing as the ex-wife.
There is sufficient evidence to charge both suspects with crimes. A complaint
request is attached.
INFORMATION
On 01-23-04, Robert Dunn and Adrienne Gubler came through the drive
up window at the State Bank of Southern Utah on St. George Blvd.
Adrienne was driving at the time. While at the drive through, Robert
deposited a check, made out to Elizabeth Dunn (his ex-wife) , into her
account. This check was for $3850.00 and written on a Certified Disaster
Services check drawn from Wells Fargo. On the deposit slip, Robert requested
that $2500 of that check, be given back to him in cash, which was done.
It wasn't until later, that SBSU found out that the Certified Disaster
check was written on an account that had been closed for about six
months.
On 01-26-04, Robert and Adrienne came through the drive up window,
again, at SBSU. This time they had another Certified Disaster check for
deposit, made out to Elizabeth Dunn, in the amount of $50 00, and
requested $2500 of it as cash back. However, SBSU denied the request,
stating that there wasn't sufficient money in the account. The female
subject, Adrienne, stated that she would have to go to her own bank and
they would cash it. Robert and Adrienne then went to the SBSU branch
inside the Washington City Walmart. There, the numbers on the deposit
slip were crossed out and changed to $2500 with a request for $1000 in
cash, which was subsequently released to the female subject.
The aforementioned $2500 check, was also written on the same closed
account. SBSU is now out $3500, just from these two transactions. There
are additional monies that SBSU has been defrauded out of by Robert,
however, the crimes relating to these monies, took place in Iron County.
The Cedar City Police Dept. has been notified.
I spoke with D'Launa Christensen, the assistant vice president of
SBSU in St. George. D'Launa told me that she was very familiar with the
case and had been in contact with the SBSU branch in Cedar City. D'Launa
was able to get for me, photos of the female subject while at the SBSU
branch inside Washington Walmart (where the $1000 was withdrawn). In
doing research on the male subject, Robert Dunn, I located a possible
address of the 346 E 680 S in Ivins. In cross referencing this address,
I located the name of Adrienne Gubler, age 33, also living at this
address. I then located a Utah drivers license for Adrienne and
subsequently obtained a photo from that drivers license. Upon comparing
the SBSU/Walmart photos with the DL photo, I could tell that I was
dealing with the same person. Thus, I determined that the female who was
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with Robert Dunn at the time of these fraudulent transactions, was Adrienne
Gubler.
SUSPECT INTERVIEW
I was then able to contact Adrienne and had her come to the police
station. On 05-24-04, I met with Adrienne. I informed her that her name
had come up in conjunction with a fraud investigation I was doing
concerning Robert Dunn. I asked Adrienne if she knew who Robert was, and
she said she did. She would later confirm this by telling me that the 2
year old daughter that was with her, was Robert's child.
I explained to Adrienne the circumstances surrounding my
investigation and then advised her of her rights. She said she
understood them and would speak with me. Adrienne admitted that she had
gone to the SBSU with Robert back in January. She said that they were
driving around and he told her that he needed to make a deposit into
Elizabeth's account. Since Adrienne was driving, he had her pull into
the drive through at SBSU on St. George Blvd. Adrienne stated that she
was told by Robert that he was on Elizabeth's account. Adrienne said
that she had no reason to doubt him. Robert then gave her a check made
out to Elizabeth Dunn for $3850. The check was written on an account
belonging to Certified Disaster Services, which is a company supposedly
owned by Robert. Again, Adrienne stated that it all appeared legitimate
to her. Adrienne does recall giving the checks and deposit slips to the
bank tellers. She admits to receiving the cash back and then handing all
of the money over to Robert.
Adrienne said that she never wrote anything on the checks or
the deposit slips, rather Robert wrote everything and just handed her
the paperwork and told her what to do. Adrienne also denied having tried
to impersonate Elizabeth. Adrienne said that she when she was asked for
identification, she told them that she didn' t have hers but that Robert
had his. This is when she gave the teller Robert's id (which SBSU made a
copy o f ) . D'Launa told me that she was present on the second occasion,
when Robert and Adrienne drove through. D'Launa specifically recalls
Adrienne saying (after informing her that that was not sufficient funds
to cash the check) that she would take it to her own bank. In reference
to the request for identification, D'Launa stated that the teller that
helped them, Michelle Pinta, told her that Adrienne said "I don't have
my identification with me, but my husband does". I specifically asked
Adrienne this question, and she denied saying this.
I personally contacted Michelle Pinta and asked her about the above
statement. Michelle recalled the female subject (now identified as
Adrienne Gubler) coming through the SBSU drive through. Michelle said
that Adrienne wanted to cash a check for over three thousand dollars
(she didn't remember the exact amount). Michelle believes that the check
was made payable to Elizabeth Dunn. Michelle asked for identification
and was told by Adrienne that she didn't have hers with her, but she did
have her husband id. Michelle said that she did not cash the check and
the car drove off. Michelle did not recall anyone else being in the car.
I also asked Adrienne if she ever thought it was strange that
Robert needed to deposit the checks into Elizabeth's account to get cash,
instead of just going to his own bank (Wells Fargo). Adrienne said she
did wonder why, but didn't think too much about it. She claimed to have
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been in an accident a while back and sustained a head injury and thus,
doesn't reason too well.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
A check on suspect Robert Dunn, shows that he currently is wanted
on three outstanding statewide warrants. I have advised the SGPD warrant
detail of this and they are actively looking for him. Adrienne told me
that he does not live at her address in Ivins, he just has his mail sent
there. She says that she has not heard from him in quite awhile.
Adrienne stated that Robert's cell phone was turned off a while ago and
since then, she doesn't have a way to contact him.
I contacted Diane McDaniel with Wells Fargo Bank. I asked her about
the account status of Certified Disaster Services and Robert Dunn. Diane
immediately recognized the name as a 'problem account'. She went through
her records and found that the account was closed in July of 2003. She
said that Wells Fargo has had to 'write o f f several hundred dollars on
this account.
I have not been able to locate Elizabeth Dunn. She is supposedly
living in Cedar City and her cell phone is temporarily disconnected.
SUMMARY
Robert passed two bad checks from his Wells Fargo business account
(Certified Disaster Services). He used his ex-wife's (Elizabeth) SBSU
account to deposit the checks and then get cash back from the deposit.
He made the checks out to Elizabeth and took a female subject with him
to do the deposits. The female subject, Adrienne Gubler, posed as
Elizabeth and helped to facilitate the transaction. The total amount of
cash back that was given to the suspects, was $3500. Robert was not on
Elizabeth's account and the business account he wrote the checks on, had
been closed for over six months. Adrienne admitted that she was with
Robert at the time of the deposits and withdrawals, but denies knowing
anything illegal was happening. Adrienne also stated that all of the
writing, on the checks and the deposit slips, was written by Robert,
which included a forged endorsement of Elizabeth's name on the back of
each bad check.

CASE STATUS
I have attached two complaint requests which names Robert Dunn and
Adrienne Gubler as the defendants. The charges are communications fraud
and forgery.
Communications Fraud because Robert and Adrienne devised a scheme
with the intent to defraud SBSU out of $3500. The scheme involved using
bad checks, the ex-wife's bank account and having Adrienne pose as the
ex wife, in an effort to help convince the bank employees that the
transactions were legitimate. The forgery, because the suspects
endorsed the bad checks and deposit slips as 'Elizabeth Dunn' and then
passed these documents with the forged signatures to the SBSU employees.
This case needs to transferred to the county attorney's office for
review and filing of charges. Attached is copies of the fraudulent
transactions as well as a written statement from suspect Adrienne
Gubler.
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Adrienne has been cooperative and should be summoned to court a
future date. Robert is currently on the run and thus, I request that an
arrest warrant be issued for him.

Responsible LEO:

Approved by:

Date
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you talked about, on two occasions Robert Dunn asked me to go
and cash some checks

for

him?

A

Yes.

Q

One was for 750, the other 250?

A

Those were two checks he put in my face and asked me

about these checks.

I couldn't remember how much the checks

were.
Q

Adrienne, you just admitted that you wrote these

statements from memory.

And now you are saying —

you are

changing your statements that you were just complying to what
he told you to write?
A

No.

He showed me checks I couldn't remember.

I

filled the statements out thinking that those were the two
checks.

Then he called me back at a later time and asked me

about the second check over to State Bank of Southern Utah.
Q

All right.

A

Those were the two occasions that I'd been tc

bank.
Q

And so, you don't remember this.

So, this whole

statement is a lie?
A

No.

On the part it says on two occasions Robert

asked me to go and cash some checks for him.

Those were the

two occasions I wenn no the bank.
Q

And then you put in your own words one was for $750,

the other was for $250?
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1

A

Those were The two checks that Detective Sargent

2 I showed me.
3I

Q

So, then you admitted to passing those two checks?

4J

A

I couldn!t remember how much they were.

5

looked at them.

6

really looked at them.

7

Q

When I sent them to the teller, I never

So, if you didnft look at them, he's depositing two

8

checks for 750 and 250.

9I

Does that make any sense?

And he!s getting back 2500.

10

A

No.

11

Q

You admitted 10 passing a 750 and a 200

12

I never

THE COURT:

$1000.

—

Counsel, that's a compound question.

13

Give her a chance to answer before you ask another one.

14

BY MR. WEILAND:

15 I
16
17I

Q

You wrote in your own statement that on two

occasions, that 750 and 250?
A

Yes, I did.

I was really flustered.

18 1 been into the police department before.
19
20

they wanted to know from me.
Q

I had never

I didn!t know what

I have never been in trouble.

And in this you also state that he asked me to go

21 I into the bank, so I did.
22

A

Yes.

23

Q

You went into the bank?

24

A

Yes, the one in Wal-Mart.

25

Q

The teller never asked for my driver's license.

She

told me that the funds were not available.

I said okay.

So

you didn't get back any money on both of these checks
according to the statement?
A

No.

Q

But you did get money back on both occasions, didn't

you?
A

Yes.

Q

The second statement that you wrote talks about the

3300-dollar check.

So, here's another check that you

admittedly passed a 3300-dollar check, correct?
A

Yes.

Q

Now, so, there's at least three instances, and you

didn't even mention in any of your statements regarding the
fourth?
MR. PENDLETON:

Your Honor, I'm going to object.

I

don't think there is even a good faith basis for asking about
checks that counsel knows were never passed or present^^ f o
anybody.

He knows "chat this is a confused statement.

And he

has no good faith basis for even asking about other
transactions.
THE COURT:

To the extent that it's a form of the

question, I'll sustain the objection.

You may rephrase your

question, Mr. Weiland.
BY MR. WEILAND:
Q

You never admitted —

or you never wrote a statement
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concerning the fifth time you went to the —

the allegedly

fifth time you went to the bank at the Washington Wal-Mart
regarding the 2,500-dollar check where you got $1000 ca3h
back, did you?

A

No.

I have been to the bank twice.

On the

second

check, the one for the bank out to Washington, Detective
Sargent called and left a message.

I returned his call and

explained it to him that I had been to that bank, got the
thousand dollars back off of that one.
time.
Q

And then the first

That was it.
And you never put that in any of your statements, did

you?
A

No.

Because I never went back up to the police

department because he never asked me to come back to the
police department to fill another siatcment out.
Q

But knew he was investigating this whole scheme,

going to the banks and presenting Elizabeth Dunn's deposit
slips and getting cash back, didn!t you?
A

Yes.

Q

In your statement you never admitted to going to

State Bank and —

well, let me rephrase that.

When you went

to State Bank on January 26th, the first time, they —
were asked for I.D.
said no.

you

And it's your statement now that yq>u

You said no.

It's Robert Dunn's account.

Then you

were denied?
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A

They said they needed to put a hold on it.

Q

And that hold didn't mean anything to you?

A

Yes.

Q

And this was after five?

A

Yes.

Q

And they could not verify funds, all the banks closed

It said that they had to verify funds.

at five, correct?
A

They didn!t tell me that.

I don't think about those

kinds of things.
Q

You didnft think about those things, so you just

voluntarily went from that bank to the next bank?
A

Yes.

I drove to another bank, yes.

Q

And you never even thought it was strange that on two

occasions, three days apart, that Robert Dunn collected
$3,500 back in cash?

That never came as suspicious to you?

A

Not really, no.

Q

Even one who is —

even one who is a meth add-'^4-

Oxycontin addict and marijuana dealer, that does not rise
suspicious to you?
A

He worked off and on.

I f^ iivoH he had money in his

account.
Q

When you interviewed, you told officer, or Detective

Sargent that Robert needed money.

That's what he told you,

correct?
A

That's what who told me?
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Q

That!s what Robert told you, is he needed money?

A

He needed to deposit money into his wife's account to

pay the rent.
Q

Then he also needed the cash back, more money than

he's actually depositing?
A

Yes.

Q

And it wasn't ever suspicious to you that
MR. PENDLETON:
MR. WEILAND:

You mean more than the net, right?
What's the question?

MR. PENDLETON:
THE COURT:

—

Well, never mind.

Go ahead, Mr. Weiland.

BY MR. WEILAND:
So,

Q

at one point, you then say he stated that he

needed money, also wanted to give rent, to provide rent for
his wife?
A

Yes.

Q

And so, you knew that she was renting the house^

correct?
A

Yes.

Q

And it was never odd to you that all this, all these

drawn checks on insurance for flood and damage on a
renting
A

—
I never looked at the bottom of the checks.

What

people do with their business accounts is their own business.
It's not mine.

226

1
2

Q

Now, how come Robert didn't sign his own name to the

account ?

3

A

I don't know.

4

Q

All right.

5

I didn't ask him.

How come Robert didn't go to his own bank

if he needed money at Wells Fargo?

6

A

I don't know.

I didn't ask him.

7

Q

How come —

8

all?

9

A

No.

10

Q

In fact, when asked, didn't you tell Detective

and it was never suspicious to you at

11

Sargent that all, ir was kind of suspicious, but I don't

12

reason too well?

13
14

A

Is that your statement?

I questioned the second time, but I didn't think

anything of it.

15

Q

Why is that?

16

A

I don't know.

17

Q

How long have you had —

18

how long have you had an

account at Wells Fargo?

19

A

Many years.

20

Q

And so, you are familiar with the banking practices?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

And so, with that, based —

23

and also all the training

and experience as a teller, none of this seems suspicious?

24

A

It is suspicious, but I didn't think about it.

25

Q

You chose not to think about it, didn't you?

J

A

No, I did not choose not to think about it.
MR. WEILAND:
THE COURT:

I have nothing further.

Anything more, Mr. Pendleton?
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. PENDLETON:
Q

Adrienne, you went to the bank on the 23rd of

January?
A

Yes.

Q

Went again to the same branch on the 2 6th, and then

on the same date you went to the Washington City branch?
A

Yes.

Q

Was there any other occasions that you went *~'"* ' ~^ed

to deposit money for Mr. Dunn or to assist him in making a
transaction?
A

No.

Q

Is there anything that you referred to in your

statement where you are intending to allude to another
transaction?
A

No.

Q

So, where do these figures of 750 and 250 come from?

A

The checks that Detective Sargent showed me.

Q

But there were no other occasions other than the

incident that we have talked about that are the subject
matter of this lawsuit:?
A

There is none.

No other occasions.

